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In a serIous setback to 
ongoing anti-Maoist operations, 22 se-
curity personnel were killed and 31 sus-
tained serious injuries in encounter with 
the dreaded Maoists along sukma-bi-
japur border in chhattisgarh. Given 
the large number of casualties involved 
including the elite cobra commandos 
of central reserve Police Force (crPF), 
questions about intelligence failures, 
security forces committing tactical mis-
takes and not following up standard op-
erating procedures have been raised by 
security experts and analysts. 
Moreover, this was not a surprise am-
bush by the Maoists on security forces. 
reportedly, this was a major combing 
operation jointly conducted by cobra 
unit of crPF, special task Force, Dis-
trict reserve Guard (DrG) and District 
Force of chhattisgarh Police to capture 
the most wanted Maoist no.1 area com-
mander Madvi Hidma. even before the 
security team issued any clarification, 
the chief minister of chhattisgarh bh-
upesh baghel was quick to reject any 
chances of intelligence failure which 
would have been the major factor lead-
ing to the loss of lives of security person-
nel. This is the last thing one expects in a 
combat situation in any major counter-
insurgency (coIn).
The irony is that an attack of this scale 
and intensity could take place at a time 
when the Indian state and its security 
forces are seen to have acquired bet-
ter combat skills and experience and 
are believed to be in dominant position 
compared to the insurgent organisation. 
Fact of the matter is that the year 2019 
(see below graph) saw one of lowest ever 
casualties among armed forces in the de-
cades. a coordinated and well-calibrated 
counterinsurgency operation from the 
federal government and the naxal-af-
fected states yielded in bringing down 
Maoist-led violence to an all-time low. 
Practically, the ultras real presence has 
been reduced to few tri-junction districts 
in chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and odisha. 
no wonder, India’s ministry of home af-
fairs (MHa) removed 44 districts from 
naxal affected list, while the ‘worst-af-
fected category’ was brought down to 
30 in 2019. as per well-known acLeD 
data, the spread of covid-19 pandemic 
brought down Maoist related incidents 
in 2020 even further than 2019 (30 per 
cent less). The country-wide lockdown 
proved a massive blow for the insurgent 
organisations as it disrupted their criti-
cal supplies and movements.
For all practical purposes, the Maoist 
organisation’s presence is now confined 
to chhattisgarh’s bastar region having 
an area of 40,000 square kilometre. This 
is a stupendous achievement for securi-
ty forces considering a decade back the 
Indian state was staring at an insurgen-
cy that was spreading like rapid fire and 
had presence over one-third of territo-
ries. Thus, it is imperative to go to the 
board room and seriously assess what 




as said earlier, such daring attack 
by the Maoist organisation at a time 
when the extremist organisation is at 
its weakest raises hard questions over 
the strategy, tactical and intelligence 
elements involved in existing counter-
insurgency operations (coIn). con-
sidering the identical pattern in which 
the security forces have been trapped 
and killed by the Maoists, be it in the 
case of Gadchiroli in Maharashtra in 
2019, incidents in the bijapur-sukma 
region in chhattisgarh in 2019-20, or 
2017 sukma killings of 25 crPF jawans, 
there are serious questions over the 
preparedness, tactical capabilities, 
and intelligence-gathering aspects in-
volved in coIn.
a close glance at operational aspects 
of coIn makes it amply clear that the key 
reason behind high casualties among se-
curity forces is due to flagrant violation 
of standard operating procedure (soP). 
In a combat situation involving a dread-
ed insurgent group, soP is what min-
imises errors and casualties. In coIn, 
high casualty can considerably demor-
alise the forces. 
two factors that are responsible for 
most frequent violation of soP are 
over-confidence and complacency. The 
over-confidence of the security forces 
against the Maoists mostly stems from 
the drastic reduction of the Maoist-relat-
ed violent incidents. While the security 
forces deserve credit in bringing down 
the violence, often taking the Maoists for 
granted have proved too costly for them. 
Moreover, one can also observe the com-
placent attitude of the security forces 
against the Maoists. 
In fighting a protracted battle against 
the ultras for more than one and half 
decades with huge success the security 
forces are seen to have brought fatigue 
and complacency. While the security 
forces are engaged in mounting oper-
ations against the Maoists, the latter is 
waiting for that moment of lapse or com-
placency of the forces. The Maoist, not-
withstanding, their weakening strength 
continue to maintain a tactical edge 
over the security forces and launch time 
to time surprise attacks in their zones, 
while the forces seem to repeat the same 
mistake at every interval. 
Issues with Central 
Paramilitary
a major challenge that the caPF de-
ployed in the Maoist affected areas faces 
is weak or ineffective coordination with 
the state police. The crux of the lack of 
coordination lies with the fact that while 
the state police forces are legally em-
powered to maintain the law-and-order 
issues, the caPF carries the burden of 
containing the Maoists. It is important 
to mention that the dominant narrative 
understands the Maoist violence as a 
law-and-order issue. 
Paradoxically, the roles of the state 
police forces and that of the caPF have 
been asymmetric. over the years the se-
curity forces belonging to the caPF, es-
pecially in chhattisgarh, have lost more 
lives compared to the state police force 
(see table). The lack of coordination 
among these forces reflects badly on the 
critical issues of sharing information 
about the Maoists, joint operations, and 
helping the caPF getting used to the lo-
cal language and other details. 
However, this critical issue of lack of 
coordination between the caPF and 
the state police is hardly highlighted or 
discussed in the open forum or any task 
force that has been constituted to exam-
ine and revisit the ongoing security oper-
ations against Maoists.
some of the important problems at the 
organisational and structural levels of 
respective caPF are also no less respon-
sible for the major casualties suffered 
by them in encounter with the Maoists 
from time to time. Particularly the crPF, 
which is heavily deployed to fight the 
Maoists has been a victim of several is-
sues relating to recruitment, promotion, 
and leadership. Most of the personnel in 
the crPF recruited as constables take 
years to be promoted. It is a reality that 
most of them retire at a low rank.
Moreover, the leadership of the force 
has always been an officer drawn from 
the Indian Police service (IPs) and 
whose tenure as the head of the force is 
for a limited period. It is safe to mention 
that such a practice has led to a huge gap 
between the leadership and the person-
nel in the crPF. Deprived of the privileg-
es of promotion and recognition to their 
services, the crPF personnel have raised 
these issues with successive govern-
ments only to get lip service of assurance 
of reformation. 
This is an important factor contrib-
uting to the low morale of the crPF 
personnel fighting the Maoist ultras. 
adding to the existing difficulties, the 
crPF always needs to take the local 
superintendent of Police (sP) for any 
operation against the Maoists. such 
legalities dilute the independence of a 
professional force like crPF. In addi-
tion to this, the IPs leadership of the 
crPF is hardly held accountable for 
the loss of lives that the latter suffers 
from. These organisational and struc-
tural complications in crPF are vital 
factors that have direct implications 
on the low morale of the security forces 
in the combat zones. 
another less debated issue with regard 
to coIn is poor intelligence gathering 
and sharing often leading to the tacti-
cal failures during combing operations 
against the Maoists. This has been the 
trend in the last 10 years or so. not well-
versed with the local language and tra-
ditions the caPF deployed in the Mao-
ists-affected areas often find it difficult 
to establish effective communication 
with the local people. 
Moreover, the presence of the caPF 
personnel in the Maoist affected areas 
which are mostly inhabited by the tribal 
and other marginalised communities is 
seen with suspicion and fear. In this pro-
cess, they have not been able to penetrate 
the Maoist ranks and files for credible and 
actionable intelligence. The surrendered 
Maoists are often seen to be close to the 
state police rather than the caPFs. The 
lack of credible or complete information 
on the movement and planning of the 
Maoists has also contributed to the loss of 
lives among the security forces. 
Culture of Accountability
to conclude, even after more than a de-
cade of hard combat against the dread-
ed Maoist organisation, both state and 
central security forces particularly in 
chhattisgarh, the key theatre of current 
anti-Maoist operations continue to suf-
fer the same fate. When Maoist did a 
major ambush in Dantewada killing as 
many as 76 crPF soldiers in 2010 and 
the MHa constituted a taskforce headed 
by e.n. ramamohan, a decorated for-
mer chief of the border security Force 
to investigate the reasons for such high 
casualties among security forces, many 
believed that this would be the last ma-
jor incident. 
However, the country, especially ch-
hattisgarh, has been experiencing several 
incidents of major Maoist attacks involv-
ing high casualties among security forc-
es. The answers for such tragic episodes 
are not difficult to find. as demonstrat-
ed earlier, neither there is any systemic 
learning evident in frequent breaches in 
soP, nor any institutional accountability 
fixed for such major incidents. 
other than 2010 Dantewada incident, 
at no other time has the head of crPF or 
other security organisations including 
state police have faced probe or account-
ability questions. no politician (read 
minister) has ever paid a price for serious 
state failures in combating the ultras. In 
short, to win the Maoists, India urgent-
ly needs a culture of accountability, be it 
police, intelligence, security bureaucracy 
and the politician.;
(Niranjan Sahoo is Senior Fellow, Ob-
server Research Foundation, New Delhi 
and Anshuman Behera is an Associate 
Professor in Conflict Resolution and 
Peace Research Program at NIAS, Ben-
galuru)
To decisively fight the Maoists, India needs a culture 
of accountability at all levels
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Security Forces killed by Maoists in last ten years
States 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021* Total
Andhra 
Pradesh
1 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 5
Bihar 10 25 7 3 15 0 3 1 0 0 64
Chhattisgarh 30 36 64 41 35 59 57 19 37 37 415
Jharkhand 25 26 14 5 8 4 10 13 2 4 111
Maharashtra 13 7 11 4 1 3 2 15 3 0 59
Odisha 15 7 1 3 3 9 1 1 2 0 42
Telangana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
West Bengal 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Data till April 17, 2021, Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) 
Source: Authors own estimation from multiple sources
Maoist Related Fatalities
